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Abstract. Due to declines in stocks, restrictive management plans, and imports of whole groundfish from Canada, the supply 
of whole fresh Atlantic groundfish to New England processing plants (landings plus whole fresh imports) declined by 75% 
since its peak in 1983. These reductions in supply of Atlantic groundfish put severe pressure on New England fresh fish 
processors. Survival techniques, including scouring local ports, Canada, and the West Coast for whole groundfish, importing 
fresh fillets, exploiting niches, substituting for groundfish, focusing more on wholesaling, and closely watching the bottom 
line, favored Boston processors, because they have advantages in transport costs, easier access to the regional food 
processing market, and share in the cost economies from brokerage, packing, transport, and wholesaling activities that 
support processing. As the smaller firms have turned to wholesaling or simply vanished, there are fewer, and typically larger 
firms. Large firms are better able to draw on widely scattered geographic sources, and adapt to display auctions, now an 
indispensable source of domestic whole fish. The forces that are reshaping the structure of the processing industry are, 
therefore, real economies of scale. While the high levels of the concentration might seem to convey substantial market power 
to large processors, the pressure on margins that has accompanied the falling supply has effectively prevented concentration 
from leading to non-competitive prices and profits. Many of the changes in structure of groundfish processing due to supply 
shortages will probably not be affected by increases in landings, when and if stocks recover. Production of frozen fish 
products declined more that fresh fish production due to falling demand for frozen products. 
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INTRODUCTION 
  Fresh fish processing and frozen fish processing are 
two separate industries in New England, each with its own 
customers, firms, and industrial organizations. While both face 
declining revenues, each has been subject to quite different 
market pressures. 
  Fresh fish processors buy whole fresh supplies from 
fishermen locally and at other New England ports, and they 
bring in fresh supplies from other parts of the US, from 
Canada and from other countries. They process the product 
(for example, cutting fish into fillets) and sell these products to 
wholesalers, retailers, restaurants, and other final users. When 
landings were plentiful in the past, most processing firms 
specialized in specific products, although a few firms, mostly 
in Boston and New Bedford, processed a wider assortment of 
fishery products to serve as a kind of one-stop shopping point 
for their customers. 
  Supply of fresh fishery products is highly volatile 
because most fish and shellfish are essentially captured in the 
wild. Farmed fishery products, a much smaller source of 
supply, are also subject to far more variability than domestic 
livestock, fruit, or vegetables. Prices that processors pay at the 
dock and the prices they receive for their products, therefore, 
vary daily and  
sometimes hourly. Haggling defines the fresh fish business. 
  The fish business is also risky. Fresh fishery products 
are marketed under extreme time pressure and with 
incomplete information. Fresh fishery products must be 
sold within a week to 10 days to final users, who are very 
concerned about product quality. Yet wholesalers and 
others who buy from processors do not generally know 
product quality because most sales are made over the 
telephone and the product arrives after the sale has been 
agreed on. Buyers take serious risks with their suppliers, 
and expect high-quality product delivered on time. 
  Processors and wholesalers selling in this market 
also take risks with their customers because they can’t 
reclaim the product for bad debts. To avoid risk, customer 
loyalty developed between fresh fish processors, their 
suppliers, and their buyers. Product quality and financial 
responsibility set the ties that bind fresh fish processors to 
their good customers and vice versa. 
Few fresh groundfish processors produce frozen 
product, and those that do sell special orders to 
institutions, usually government agencies, who are 
sometimes required to purchase U.S. product. Frozen 
groundfish processors buy frozen inputs, which are 
imported into the United States from Canada, Iceland, 
Norway, and from around the world. These frozen inputs, 
mostly frozen blocks of fillets, are processed into frozen 
portions, sticks, and other products for sale to 
supermarkets, restaurants, and institutions. Frozen 
products keep for a long time and are not subject to the 
same time constraints as fresh products. Prices are less 
volatile, markets more impersonal, and business relations IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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more competitive. Frozen groundfish plants are also much 
larger than fresh groundfish plants, and they operate longer 
through the day and through the year. 
REDUCED SUPPLY OF GROUNDFISH 
Fresh fish processors in New England find their supply of 
groundfish from New England landings, whole groundfish 
imports from Canada, and fresh and frozen whole groundfish 
from the West Coast. Except for a modest recovery in the 
early 1990’s, groundfish landings in New England have 
declined continuously since their peak in 1983 (Figure 1). 
Landings increased sharply following the extension of the 
exclusive fishing zone in 1976, but by 1997, New England 
landings were less than half of what they were in 1976, before 
the EFZ.  
 
Figure 1. Supply of fresh groundfish to New England. 
(Source: NMFS) 
 
Imports of whole groundfish from Canada mitigated 
the decline in groundfish supply to New England processors 
during the 1980’s, but this source of supply began to dry up 
after 1993. In 1991, Canada closed the Grand Banks, once the 
richest cod grounds in the world, to fishing for cod, and it has 
not allowed commercial fishing for cod since. Landings in 
Newfoundland from the Grand Banks were mainly processed 
into frozen blocks, and landings in Nova Scotia, not from the 
Grand Banks, had been chief source of whole fresh groundfish 
to New England. Higher prices for fresh fillets and a U.S. 
countervailing duty on whole groundfish imports from Canada 
had led Nova Scotia processors to export fresh fillets rather 
than whole fish to the U.S. 
When their Canadian supply declined, New England 
processors substituted some whole fish imports from Iceland, 
but most of the increase in imports from Iceland into the U.S. 
was in the form of fresh fillets. Fresh groundfish fillets 
imported from Iceland have largely replaced imports from 
Canada. Iceland Air flies directly from Iceland to Boston, 
carrying 2 million lbs. of fresh fillets in 1997 (Wall Street 
Journal, 3/11/98).  Between 1990 and 1997, imported 
fresh fillets from Iceland increased from 3 million lbs. to 
8 million lbs., while fresh fillet imports from Canada 
dropped from 20 million lbs. to 4 million lbs. (Georgianna 
and Dirlam, 1999). Fillet imports do not, of course, 
necessarily flow to processors; they may also be imported 
by wholesalers. 
New England processors told us in a series of 
interviews conducted in 1997-1998 that whole Pacific cod 
was coming into New England, mostly into Boston, from 
the U.S. West Coast. Some of it was frozen and then 
thawed or refreshed and cut into groundfish fillets for 
East Coast markets. There are no data on movements of 
groundfish products within the U.S., but the smaller 
decline in New England fresh fillet production than in 
New England and Canadian whole groundfish supply 
supports the observation that New England processors 
have substituted Pacific cod for Atlantic groundfish.  
DECLINE OF FRESH FISH PROCESSING 
The expansion of the fishing industry that followed the 
200-mile limit carried over into the fresh fish processing 
industry. Established firms in Boston, New Bedford, and 
Gloucester hired fish cutters, trimmers, packers, and other 
specialized tradespeople, and they paid good wages to 
prepare fresh fillets for the market. New firms sprang up 
in these ports, and in the smaller ports, especially on Cape 
Cod, new firms and fishing cooperatives tried their hand 
at cutting and marketing fresh fillets. Fresh fish was 
available on the docks, and fresh product was easy to sell 
to health-conscious consumers at high prices. Fishermen 
increased their catch of other products such as sea 
scallops, which are almost always shucked at sea, other 
high-valued species, such as lobster, and even lesser-
valued products like herring and squid. Shoreside 
processors bought and processed or simply repackaged 
whatever fishermen landed and quickly sold the products 
on the wholesale market for high prices. Business was 
good. 
  When fishing began its downward spiral in the 
early 1980’s, the fresh fish processing sector followed. 
Rising prices pushed revenues higher but not for long 
because higher prices increased consumer demand for 
substitute products. Prices for fishery products were 
limited by the prices of these substitutes. 
The value of fresh processed products in New 
England reached its peak in 1986 at $300 million, but fell 
to $215 million by 1995, before recovering somewhat to 
$240 million in 1997. Adjusting these values for inflation 
by converting to 1997 dollars shows a more dramatic 
decline. The real value of fresh product fell by nearly 50 
percent from its peak in 1986 (Figure 2). Almost all the 
decline in fresh product value was in fresh fillets caused 
by the collapse of groundfish landings in New England. 
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Figure 2. Value of New England processed fish products   
  (Source:  NMFS) 
 
Some firms have found it impossible to continue in 
business in the face of this drastic decline in supply of raw 
material and production. They liquidated. More than one-third 
of the firms in business in 1992 have since left (Figure 3). 
Surviving firms adopted a wide assortment of strategies to stay 
in business. Fish processing and wholesaling firms—family 
businesses for several generations, with established goodwill 
and experience in meeting crises—were not likely to exit  
Surviving processors intensified their buying within 
New England, to ensure that they maintained at least their 
share of the dwindling landings. They went farther afield from 
their home port to establish new buying relationships. 
Processors adjusted their purchasing to the marketing 
innovation of display auctions that were recently established 
in New Bedford and Gloucester. These auctions were modeled 
on the Portland Fish Exchange, which had successfully 
modernized Maine’s fishing industry a few years before. As 
supply continued to shrink, the surviving processors scoured 
the smaller ports for product, buying wherever they could, 
often in very small lots. 
  In addition, surviving processors imported more 
whole and processed fish. Canada, however, the traditional 
supplier of groundfish to the United States, had also suffered a 
sharp decline in landings. As noted in the previous section, 
shipments of whole Pacific cod to Boston probably reduced 
the shortage of whole groundfish to New England processors, 
but the higher prices for groundfish fillets also drew 
competitors into the fresh fillet market, mainly from Iceland 
and Canada. 
 
Because they couldn’t find enough traditional products to 
satisfy their customers, processors switched to different 
species and products before local fishermen did. 
 
 
Figure 3. Fresh fish processing employment and 
number of plants in New England. 
(Source: NMFS, DET) 
 
They persuaded their customers to buy 
substitutes, even though New England consumers in 
particular were reputed to have an indissoluble attachment 
to traditional species. Processors and wholesalers 
imported farmed salmon, shark, tilapia, mahi mahi, and 
orange roughy, and they brought products from other 
parts of the country, such as catfish from the South, to 
supply restaurants and retail fish counters in New England 
and elsewhere. 
  Some fresh fish processors exploited niches such 
as selling high-quality product directly to customers for 
special events, such as catered business cocktail parties, 
promotions, trade shows, and even private parties. Some 
processors stopped cutting fillets in order to save 
expenses and concentrated instead on using their business 
contacts and inside information to wholesale products 
without processing them. 
  All surviving processors paid more attention to 
the bottom line. Shortage of supply of raw material 
intensified competition in buying whole groundfish 
among fresh groundfish processors. Other costs also 
increased. Substantial new investment in both equipment 
and training was necessary to conform to new health 
regulations. Final demand prices at the retail level, 
however, didn’t rise as much because competition from 
substitutes like chicken severely limited price increases 
for fishery products. Supermarkets improved their 
handling and marketing of fresh fish products, attracting 
customers rebelling against higher prices in specialized 
fish markets. Dozens of small fish markets went out of 
business. Processors sold less product to fish markets,  
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where they had developed personal relations, sometimes over 
several generations, and more product to supermarkets, which 
operated on narrow margins of their own and traditionally 
drove hard bargains with their suppliers.\ 
  Most of these survival strategies favored Boston 
firms. Access to Logan Airport and access to the New England 
regional food wholesaling system in Boston gave them an 
advantage over processing firms in other ports. Access to raw 
material gave other ports an advantage during the boom in 
landings, but this advantage has disappeared with the decline 
in landings. New Bedford processors, who used to truck whole 
fish into the city from other ports, now process only the fish 
that is landed locally. Processors in Gloucester and other 
Massachusetts ports now process fillets for local customers 
and ship the rest whole to Boston for processing. 
 
DECLINE OF FROZEN FISH PROCESSING 
As with fresh groundfish processors, frozen groundfish 
processors suffered a shortage of supply. Before 1991, most 
cod frozen blocks, the raw material for most frozen groundfish 
products were imported from Canada. Following the decline 
of Canadian landings after the closure of the Grand Banks to 
cod fishing in 1991, imports of cod blocks to the U.S. decline 
sharply (Figure 4). As cod block imports were declining, U.S. 
imports of pollock blocks were increasing as rapidly as cod 
block imports were declining. After declining sharply in the 
early 1990's, total imports of frozen blocks have recovered. By 
1998, imported groundfish blocks were about 85 percent of 
their total in 1990 (Fisheries of the U.S.). 
The import data implies substitution between cod and 
pollock blocks, due to the scarcity of cod and the abundance 
of pollock, especially from Russia, which has a large fleet and 
almost desperate need for hard currency.  
There is little direct evidence, however, of 
substitution of pollock for cod, because pollock has different 
qualities from cod, including taste and texture. Industry 
sources, however, told us that large producers of breaded 
cooked fillets, portions, and nuggets have almost completely 
replaced cod with pollock in 1996 and 1997. Most U.S. 
production of pollock block seems to go into surimi, which is 
now widely sold in supermarkets throughout the U.S. 
Frozen fish processors located mostly in Gloucester 
and New Bedford, however, faced a different set of problems 
than the declining supply that checked fresh fish processors. 
Consumer demand for fish sticks and portions, the major 
products of this sector, has been declining since mid-1980, 
driving down production and prices. The combination of 
falling production and prices caused a sharp drop in revenues. 
Actual revenues for frozen fishery products processed in 
Massachusetts dropped more than 50 percent from their peak 
in 1986. After accounting for inflation, frozen processed 
product sales dropped by more than 60 percent (Figure 2). 
Fish canneries left Massachusetts long ago. 
Upscale frozen and freeze-dried products for easy 
preparation in microwave ovens have never fulfilled their 
promise in the United States. Long a high value-added product 
in Northern Europe for households where  
Figure 4. Imports of Cod and Pollock Blocks to the 
U.S. (Source: Fisheries of the United States, NMFS) 
 
almost all women work outside the home compared to 
about 60% of women in the U.S. who are in the labor 
force, these products have never caught on here. 
Increasing value-added through better product remains the 
main hope for an industry where the source of supply is 
declining, but raising prices for higher quality has rarely 
worked in any sector of the U.S. fishing industry. 
 
Figure 5. Fish processing employment and number of 
plants in New England. 
(Source: Fisheries of the United States, NMFS) 
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While we were not able to separate frozen fish processors 
from other fish processors due to the wide assortment of 
frozen and fresh product, data on fish processing plants in 
New England support the hypothesis that employment and the 
number of frozen fish processing plants have declined (Figure 
5). The number of plants, relatively stable through the 1980’s 
and early 1990’s, dropped sharply after 1994. Employment 
has declined steadily through the 1980’s and 1990’s. 
 
Stability of Wholesaling 
As stated earlier, many processing firms seemed to have 
abandoned the processing side of their business to concentrate 
on wholesaling because they could still trade on their contacts 
will buyers, supplying them with product that they purchased 
from other processors. The increase in imports of traditional 
products and imports of a wide assortment of new products 
also offered profit potential to existing wholesalers and those 
firms that shifted from processing to wholesaling. The number 
of wholesale firms in New England have increased steadily 
from less than 400 in 1982 to over in 1997 (Figure 6.). 
Employment has remained roughly constant at around 4,500 
people, except for a large, unexplained drop in 1991. 
The surprising growth in wholesaling may be 
reversed if Internet marketing, still in its infancy, is 
increasingly used to bring processors and customers together. 
Small processors may benefit, but wholesalers will be hurt. By 
consolidations and acquisitions, processors and customers join 
forces, or, as in case of Legal Seafood, the customer owns 
processor plants. Large international producer-marketers have 
trespassed conventional channels of distribution and now by-
pass importers, brokers, wholesalers, distributors and freight 
forwarders. 
 
Figure 6. Fish processing employment and number of                
plants in New England. 
(Source: NMFS, DET) 
 
ELEMENTS OF MARKET STRUCTURE 
Where the number of competing firms is large, the power 
of any one of them to act independently on either the 
buying or selling side of the market may be limited. When 
there are only a few sellers, however, they may find it 
easier to collude, or a dominant firm may take the 
initiative, in raising or lowering a prevailing product 
price. A few large buyers at a display auction, for 
instance, might find it easier to arrive at tacit or overt 
agreements for the allocation of lots before the bidding 
begins, in order to moderate or avoid vigorous  
Competition (Figure 6). And competition in an industry 
dominated by a few large firms, where each firm is 
familiar with its competitors’ product and price strategies 
is far removed form that encountered in typical 
commodity markets. 
The extent to which a given market, in this 
instance processed groundfish, may be subject to 
oligopoly or monopoly power, is customarily determined 
by examining three major elements of market structure: 
concentration, distribution among firms of market shares, 
and ease or difficulty of entry of new firms. These 
measures can be useful, however, only when they are 
applied to relevant markets. The Antitrust Division and 
the Federal Trade Commission have adopted guidelines 
that rely on measures of substitutability among products 
and between locations to isolate markets wherein they can 
determine the degree of monopoly power or the presence 
of effective competition. We need to know, therefore, 
whether New England can be regarded as an 
economically distinct geographic market, and fresh and 
frozen products as separately distinct products, before 
attempting to apply the market structure test. 
New England as a geographic market 
There are, unfortunately, few if any quantitative data 
about the extent to which processed groundfish is shipped 
into or out of New England. Nevertheless, the processors’ 
historical dependence on regional landings and imports of 
whole groundfish and fresh and frozen fillets from 
Canada’s Atlantic provinces, the absence of significant 
numbers of processors of groundfish in states outside 
New England, and the jurisdiction of the New England 
Fish Management Council, combine to justify using New 
England as the outer geographic boundary for the 
groundfish processing sector.  
  Smaller or more extended geographic areas fail 
to satisfy minimum relevant market criteria. The area 
where a processor sells most of its product (usually not far 
from the port where the whole fish is landed) would not 
qualify as a market because the costs of bringing in fresh 
product from other New England processors are minimal. 
On the other hand, though many if not most New England 
groundfish processors ship to customers outside New 
England some as far away as Florida and California--the 
largest share of the output of New England processors is 
sold within New England. Unless and until processors 
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outside the region account for more than half of the groundfish 
consumed there, New England appears to be the relevant 
market for estimating market power in the sale of groundfish. 
  From the input side of both fresh and frozen 
processing markets, New England can be regarded as a 
distinct geographic market. Some New England processors 
have strong connections with particular Canadian brokers, but 
as with the sale of fillets, the New England processor cannot 
exclude its competitors from buying whole fish or fillets 
through the same broker. Even if the processor had established 
a kind of lock or preferred position, shortage of Canadian 
groundfish has weakened or destroyed the connection. 
Fresh and frozen groundfish as distinct products  
In considering the output of fresh fillets of major groundfish 
species: cod, haddock, flounder and pollock, as a single 
relevant product, we are following industry usage. The 
products are not perfect substitutes, but they are extremely 
close, and most processors cut at least two of the species. 
Consumers do not consider frozen fillets to be the equivalent 
of fresh, as witnessed by the prevailing practice of retailers 
selling refreshed (frozen converted to fresh) fillets when the 
fresh product is in short supply. Other frozen fish products--
breaded and cooked sticks, portions, nuggets etc. are clearly 
only imperfect substitutes for fresh fillets, and the structure of 
the frozen fish product market in New England will therefore 
be examined separately. 
FRESH PRODUCT MARKET STRUCTURE  
Survival strategies substantially altered the structure of the 
fresh processing sector. Since changes in structure can 
increase or create centers of market power, and, in any event, 
are sometimes associated with chances in competitive 
behavior, it is useful to examine this by-product of the supply 
crisis. Did an unintended consequence of the reduction in the 
number of sellers (and buyers) in the New England groundfish 
industry enable them to offset the supply shortage by selling at 
more favorable prices, and paying less for their whole fish? 
The number of fresh groundfish processors fell by 
40% from 100 in 1990, to 60 in 1997, the last year for which 
information by product type by plant is available (Figure 4). 
Average fillet production per plant fell from 680,000 lb. in 
1990 to 300,000 lb or 63%, in 1997 (Georgianna and Dirlam, 
1999). The average dollar value of sales however, rose 15% 
from $2.77 million in 1990 to $3.1 million in 1997 in constant 
dollars. As noted earlier, the decline in the number of 
processing firms was accounted for not only by liquidation but 
also by their transformation into wholesaling. An arithmetic 
average of dollar sales suffers from certain deficiencies, but it 
does indicate that those firms that did not exit fresh fish 
processing enjoyed a final price roughly offsetting the fall in 
output. Average employment per plant also remained constant, 
at about 16-17 per firm. Employment figures are not wholly 
reliable, however, because fresh fish processors have tended to 
contract out for services of cutters and other employees. The 
implications for estimating the minimum efficient firm are that 
that its dollar volume of sales should be around $3 million 
per year. 
Changes in concentration 
Concentration of output can be measured by estimating 
the share of the largest 4 (CR 4) and the largest 8 (CR 8) 
firms. Applying this test it appears that the New England 
fresh fillet industry was significantly concentrated in 1990 
and has increased subsequently. Between 1990 and 1997, 
the CR 4 ratio rose from 43% to 58%, and the CR8 ratio 
from 57% to 70% (Georgianna and Dirlam, 1999). This 
left only 30% of the market to be shared in 1997 by the 
remaining 52 firms. Where CR4 is above 50% the market 
is usually classified as an oligopoly, where the largest 
firms are capable of exercising a moderate degree of 
market power. 
  The Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) provides 
a measure of inequality of market shares. The index is 
derived by squaring and summing up the market share of 
each firm in the market. A one-firm industry would have 
an index of 10,000; if 100 equally sized firm share the 
market the index will be 100. The Antitrust Guidelines 
classify a market with an HHI of 1,800 as highly 
concentrated, and with less than 1,000 as effectively 
competitive. Unlike the CR 4 or the CR8, the HHI takes 
into account the market share of every firm, and by 
squaring the share percentages, it emphasizes the role of 
large firms. A CR 4 of 100% would have an HHI of 2,500 
if each firm had 25% of the market, but if one firm had 
97%, the HHI would be 9,412. 
  The New England fresh fish processing market 
HHI was low during the years 1990--1994, with a 
minimum of 600 in 1993, but by 1997, it had risen to 
1200, bringing it beyond the threshold of Guidelines’ 
concerns. 
Competition and Structure in Leading Ports 
Concentration ratios by port are, to be sure, in quite high 
ranges: CR4 for Portland is close to 100%, New Bedford 
82%, Gloucester 90% and Boston, 75% (Georgianna and 
Dirlam, 1999). HHIs are in each case extremely high. And 
in New Bedford and Boston, sharp increases reflect the 
fact that one or two large processors now account for an 
even larger share of output. Our examination of 
competition in the ports indicates that, in effect, they do 
not constitute distinct geographic markets. Processors in 
each port compete for orders by the same regional fillet 
customers. And while Boston now plays an even more 
important role as a destination for fish landed or 
auctioned off in Gloucester and Portland, the net return to 
the sellers of whole fish has if anything improved. 
Market Structure and Competition   
Despite the relatively high indices of concentration, and 
especially inequality of market shares, there is little 
evidence that the larger firms have been better able to 
exercise market power to the detriment of either their IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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customers or their suppliers. Small scale customers, such as 
fish markets have been replaced by larger and ever more 
powerful regional and national supermarkets and food service 
companies. Even the largest of the processors must cut costs to 
the bone to win or keep contracts with these big buyers. And 
while some smaller competitors complain that the larger firms 
have been able to maintain exclusive rights to landings by 
some of the trawlers, there is, as far as we can tell, little 
indication that collusion or dominant firm behavior has 
distorted auction prices by artificially depressing ex-vessel 
prices. 
Conventionally, highly concentrated market structure 
and behavior are linked, above all and first and foremost, by 
generating prices above those that would prevail were there 
effective competition among a large number of firms. 
Wholesale prices of processed groundfish in the geographic 
New England market could very well, given the prevailing 
concentration levels, be determined by collusion, tacit 
agreement, or price leadership by one or two dominant firms. 
Margins and profits would tend to be higher than in effectively 
competitive markets. Our analysis shows just the opposite. 
Although wholesale transaction prices and quantities are no 
longer available, we were able to calculate processors’ 
operating margin for a typical important species, yellowtail 
flounder, from 1987 to 1997, which rose to a peak of 40% in 
1990, and fell to 15% in 1997 (Georgianna and Dirlam, 1999). 
The larger processors have been able to maintain 
profit margins of 1 to 2%, leaving them an adequate return on 
investment, by practices noted earlier: substituting new 
products, rigorously controlling operating costs, and, by 
providing reliability and uniform quality, selling to a few, 
much larger customers, thus cutting shipping and marketing 
costs. 
 
FROZEN PRODUCT MARKET STRUCTURE 
Products of New England frozen groundfish plants consist of 
sticks and portions, fillets and, to compete with specialized 
plants elsewhere, a widening variety of cooked and breaded 
products. Total value of product fell 33 1/3% from $600 
million in 1990 to $400 million in 1997; physical volume by a 
somewhat similar percentage--prices of frozen products have 
not appreciated substantially. Prior to the drastic decline in 
cod stocks, raw material consisted of blocks imported almost 
exclusively from Canada, Iceland and Norway. Currently, 
pollock blocks mostly from Russia have largely replaced these 
earlier sources. Only rarely if ever were New England 
groundfish landings processed into frozen blocks. 
Number of Plants and Market Share 
 Although the number of frozen fish product plants in New 
England has not been officially reported, it is common 
knowledge that there are only four of importance: Frionor, 
Fishery Products, Gortons, and National Sea Products. We 
have no reason to believe that the share of the big 4, which we 
estimate at 70%, has altered appreciably. A CR 4 ratio 
summarizes the New England frozen products industry in both 
1990 and 1997. It is possible that the HHI has shifted, but 
we don't know in which direction. See Figure 3.  
  It may be that the processing plant totals 
appearing in Figure 5 include shellfish, squid, monkfish, 
skate, and lobster marketers as well as plants producing 
fresh and frozen products. In any event it was impossible 
for us to allocate the residual 225 plants in 1990, and 80 
plants in 1997 not producing fillets between frozen and 
fresh products other than fillets. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In an earlier publication, we summarized New England 
groundfish processors' reactions to the decline in supply 
of whole fish, the resultant changes in industry structure, 
and our predictions as to future developments 
(Georgianna and Dirlam, 1994). From our current 
interviews and data analysis, we conclude that almost all 
trends in structure and in management policies we found 
in 1994 have continued and intensified. 
 
1.  Despite the continuing decline of groundfish landings 
at the port, Boston continues to lead fresh groundfish 
processing in New England.  In 1997, Boston landed 
only about 10% of the area's total groundfish 
landings, but it produced about 50% of the New 
England's fresh fillets.  Boston's share of New 
England's fillet production has remained close to 50% 
since 1992, but Boston firms have increased their 
share of the fresh fish market in other ways.  Air-
freighted whole Pacific cod, and most substitutes for 
or supplements to local fresh fillets, such as imported 
fresh fillets, are flown into Logan Airport, which is 
easily accessible to Boston processors.  Boston 
processing firms have reinforced their port's position 
as the leading processing center in New England, 
with all the associated brokerage, packing, transport, 
and wholesaling activities that support processing.  In 
other words, Boston processing firms have kept and 
probably expanded their customer base.  
 
2.  With the possible exception of Gloucester, processors 
in other ports have not fared as well as those in 
Boston.  Processors in smaller ports have either 
disappeared or now supply only small amounts to 
local customers.  The same is true for Portland 
processors, who have not gained much from the 
success of the Portland display auction.  Some New 
Bedford processors switched to monkfish, dogfish, 
and skate when landings of these species increased, 
selling them to a different set of customers from 
those that bought groundfish fillets.  New Bedford 
has lost its dominance in flounder production, and 
Boston firms produce much of the port’s fresh 
groundfish fillets with plants in New Bedford.   
Gloucester has maintained its small niche in fresh 
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3.  Long-term relationships or loyalties between processors, 
their suppliers, and their customers have continued to 
erode, contributing to the day to day variability of 
exvessel input prices on the one hand, and wholesale 
prices on the other. As we noted in 1993, when loyalties 
vanish, hard bargaining takes their place.  Although 
operating and profit margins may not have changed 
radically on an annualized basis for the firms that still 
process groundfish, profit margins have become 
increasingly difficult to maintained in each transaction 
and over time. 
 
4.  The survival techniques we noted in 1993, including 
importing fresh fillets, exploiting niches, substituting for 
groundfish, focusing more on wholesaling, and closely 
watching the bottom line, have been extended, and 
became essential features of successful processors' 
purchasing and marketing strategies.  Whereas in 1993, 
West Coast whole cod was something of a novelty, many 
processors today buy frozen whole fish from the West 
Coast and Alaska as a matter of course.  And other new 
sources have been tapped to replace the shrinking supply 
of Canadian whole groundfish. As the shortage of the 
major groundfish species persisted and became 
accentuated, consumers have become willing to accept 
domestic and imported substitutes. Those firms that 
adapted to or promoted the change have been able to 
diversify their output and maintain volume. Many small 
processors, however, which were the most dependent on a 
relatively stable price structure and easy availability of 
whole groundfish, have not been able to finance the 
initiation and successful maintenance of these innovative 
strategies and have quit the industry. The number of 
processors has, accordingly, continued to decline.  
 
5.  Boston's advantages in transport costs and clustering far 
outweigh access to local landings of processors in other 
ports.  Processors at other ports, dependent on local 
landings, have not found it easy to implement any of these 
survival strategies.  
 
6.  As the smaller firms have turned to wholesaling or simply 
vanished, not only are there fewer, and typically larger 
firms, but the processors' markets have become even more 
concentrated than in 1992.  Market buying power has not, 
however, increased to the same extent as the higher 
concentration ratios.  As far as we can tell, collusion 
among a few buyers, if it exists, has not been able to 
distort the auction process by depressing prices.  In the 
wholesale and retail markets, small-scale customers, such 
as fish markets, have disappeared due to customer 
preference for convenience.  The larger processing firms 
now compete among themselves for orders from even 
larger and more powerful super markets and food service 
companies.  Increasing concentration in this declining 
market has not given large processing firms market power 
as sellers in wholesale markets. 
7.  Though no processor can be said to enjoy an assured 
supply of whole fish, large firms are better able to 
draw on widely scattered geographic sources, and 
adapt to display auctions, now an indispensable 
source of domestic whole fish.  The forces that are 
reshaping the structure of the processing industry are, 
therefore, real economies of scale.  While the high 
levels of the concentration ratios and the HHI 
considered in the abstract might seem to convey 
substantial market power to large processors, the 
pressure on margins that has accompanied the falling 
supply has effectively prevented concentration from 
leading to non-competitive prices and profits.  
 
8.  In our previous report (Georgianna and Dirlam, 
1993), we assumed that increased supplies of 
underutilized species such as monkfish, skate, and 
dogfish would very likely lead to intense price 
competition for a small share of established markets.  
This did not occur.  Demand expanded for these and 
other species, followed by intensive fishing and then 
stock declines.  These formerly underutilized stocks 
are now severely depleted, and U.S. Department of 
Commerce is preparing restrictive management plans 
for these species. 
 
9.  In our previous report, we observed an increase in the 
number of wholesaling firms and wholesaling 
employment, which we attributed to some firms 
switching from cutting fillets to simply buying and 
selling whole fish or previously processed fillets.  We 
predicted that many of these entries into wholesaling 
were temporary, because some of the firms that 
switched from processing to wholesaling could not 
survive competitive pressure in the wholesaling 
sector.  There is some but not conclusive evidence for 
this.  Massachusetts Division of Employment and 
Training data show a decline in the rate of increase in 
the number of firms and an absolute decline in 
wholesaling employment.   
 
10.  Although stock recovery does not look promising for 
any Atlantic groundfish species, an increase in 
groundfish stocks and landings could stabilize or may 
even reverse declines in employment and in the 
number of processing firms.  Many of the changes in 
structure of groundfish processing due to supply 
shortages, for example, the dominance of Boston 
firms, the growing importance of display auctions, 
and weakened customer loyalty, will probably not be 
affected by increases in landings, when and if stocks 
recover. 
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